UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

4-30-2020

State v. Vazquez-Torres Appellant's Brief Dckt. 47711

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. Vazquez-Torres Appellant's Brief Dckt. 47711" (2020). Not Reported. 6452.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6452

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
4/30/2020 4:09 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
vs.

Plaintiff/Respondent,

Supreme Court No. 47711-2020
Twin Falls County District Court
Case No.: CR42-18-11902

JACOBO VAZQUEZ-TORRES,
Defendant/Appellant.
_____________________________________________________________________________
APPELLANT’S BRIEF
_____________________________________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
_____________________________________________________________________________
HONORABLE BENJAMIN J. CLUFF, DISTRICT JUDGE PRESIDING
_____________________________________________________________________________
Grant Loebs
Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney
Twin Falls County Courthouse
P.O. Box 126
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126

Michael D. Danielson
BENOIT, ALEXANDER &
MOLLERUP, PLLC
P.O. Box 366
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0366

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES……………………………………………………….i
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW……………………………………………………………….1

II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE……………………………………………………………1
A.
B.
C.

Statement of the Case……………………………………………………………...2
Statement of Facts…………………………………………………………………2
The Proceedings Below…………………………………………………………...3

III.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL…………………………………………………….3

IV.

ARGUMENT……………………………………………………………………………...4
A.

V.

The district court erred when it held that the jury had been presented with
substantial evidence at trial that Appellant had driven or was in actual
physical control of the vehicle……………………………………………………4
i.

The jury convicted on proximity and a lack of investigation…………….4

ii.

There was not enough circumstantial evidence on the record upon
which a reasonable jury can have concluded, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Appellant was guilty of Excessive DUI………………………6

CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE…………………………………………………………………..10

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Cases
Elec. Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v. Nielson
136 Idaho 814, 41 P.3d 242 (2001)………………………………………………………….....1
Mortensen v. Berian
163 Idaho 47, 408 P.3d 45 (2017)……………………………………………………………...1
State v. Oliver
144 Idaho 722, 170 P.2d 387 (2007)…………………………………………………………...1
State v. Schiermeier
165 Idaho 447 P.3d 895 (2019)………………………………………………………………1, 4
State v. Sheahan
139 Idaho 267, P.3d 956 (2003)………………………………………………………………...1
State v. Tryon
164 Idaho 254, 429 P.3d 142 (2018)…………………………………………………………6, 9

Rules
I.C. § 18-8004(C)………………………………………………………………………………….2
I.C. § 18-8004(5)…………………………………………………………………………………..9

i

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and
for Twin Falls County, Honorable Benjamin J. Cluff, presiding.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Over matters of law, appellate courts exercise free review and are unbound by a lower
court’s legal conclusions, meaning they are free to draw their own conclusions from the facts
presented. Mortensen v. Berian, 163 Idaho 47, 48, 408 P.3d 45, 48 (2017); see also Elec.
Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814, 820, 41 P.3d 242, 248 (2001) (holding that
Idaho’s appellate courts exercise free review over lower courts’ conclusions of law to determine
(1) whether the court correctly stated the applicable law and (2) whether the legal conclusions are
sustained by the facts found).
When determining whether to overturn a judgment of conviction entered on jury verdict,
an appellate court should consider whether a “reasonable trier of fact could have found that the
prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 286, 77 P.3d 956, 975 (2003); see also State v.
Schiermeier, 165 Idaho 447, 451, 447 P.3d 895, 899 (2019) (holding that the only inquiry for a
reviewing court is whether there is “substantial evidence” upon which a reasonable jury could have
found that the State met its burden of proving each essential element of the charged crimes beyond
a reasonable doubt). In making this determination, the Court should “view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, and . . . not substitute [its] judgment for that of the jury
regarding the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the evidence, and the reasonable inferences
to be drawn from the evidence.” State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724, 170 P.3d 387, 389 (2007).
Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining
whether a disputed point of fact has been proven. Schiermeier, 165 Idaho at 451, 447 P.3d at 899.
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II.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Statement of the Case
This appeal challenges the district court’s Memorandum Opinion on Appeal, which

affirmed the jury’s verdict convicting Appellant of Excessive DUI, where the only evidence
connecting Appellant to the subject vehicle was that the vehicle was registered to a female with
the same last name and testimony that he had been observed by witnesses in the physical proximity
of the vehicle, prior to his arrest, at a different location a couple of miles away. This case therefore
presents the following question: was it error for the district court to find that substantial evidence
was presented to the jury that Appellant drove or was in actual physical control of the vehicle, an
essential element of the State’s DUI charge.
B.

Statement of Facts
On October 9, 2018, law enforcement picked up Appellant, Jacobo Vazquez-Torres, in

Filer, Idaho, after receiving reports that he had been seen earlier walking away from a vehicle on
the side of the road. Later, it was discovered that the vehicle in question was registered to a female
with the same last name as Appellant. 1 (Trial Tr. 101:11-16). After failing a field sobriety test,
Appellant was arrested and taken to the station, where he was then administered a breathalyzer
test. He was ultimately charged with Excessive DUI, a violation of I.C. § 18-8004C.
The case proceeded to trial on May 30, 2019. On the Excessive DUI count, the main issue
for trial was whether Appellant was ever driving and/or in actual physical control of the vehicle. 2
At trial, the only testimony physically linking Appellant to the vehicle was the testimony of Kelly
Natwick, Melissa Garcia and Brenda Whiteley. Ms. Natwick testified that she had seen Appellant

It is not clear whether this means the female registrant’s “last name” was Torres, Vazquez, or Vazquez-Torres.
Appellant was also charged with Leaving the Scene of a Property Damage Accident. His conviction on that count
has already been overturned on appeal for lack of substantial evidence.

1
2
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near the car, before circling back and offering him a ride. (Trial Tr. 45:19-24; 46:22-23). Ms.
Garcia and Ms. Whiteley both testified that they had seen a man leaning into the passenger side
door of the vehicle and then walking away. (Trial Tr. 60:10-20; 67:15-68:2). After they witnessed
the man get into Ms. Natwick’s vehicle, they called the police and followed because they assumed
that the man had driven the other vehicle and was leaving the scene. (Trial Tr. 63:11-64:4). No
witness testified that they had seen the Appellant driving, or observed him in the driver’s seat,
leaving the driver’s seat, or otherwise in actual physical control of the vehicle at any point. No
witness had seen the vehicle being operated by anyone. Nor was there any testimony by any
witness concerning how long the vehicle had been at that location.
The jury convicted Appellant of Excessive DUI, which he timely appealed. On 12/30/19,
the honorable Benjamin J. Cluff affirmed that conviction.
C.

The Proceedings Below
This matter comes to this Court on appeal of the district court’s Memorandum Opinion on

Appeal (the “Opinion”), issued on 12/30/19.

In that Opinion, the district court affirmed

Appellant’s Excessive DUI conviction, holding that because (1) three witnesses testified that
Appellant was the only person that they saw near the vehicle, (2) two of those witnesses testified
that they saw Appellant leaning into the vehicle’s passenger door, (3) no other person was found
either near or in the vehicle, and (4) that Appellant smelled of alcohol, there was substantial
evidence upon which the jury could convict.
III.
A.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did the district court err in holding that the jury was presented with substantial evidence
that Appellant had driven or was in actual physical control of the vehicle in question?
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IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

The district court erred when it held that the jury had been presented with
substantial evidence at trial that Appellant had driven or was in actual physical
control of the vehicle.
At trial, the State provided evidence that (1) there was a vehicle on the side of the roadway

that appeared to have hit a pole, (2) three witnesses saw Appellant either near or leaning into the
passenger side of the vehicle, (3) no other person was found to be near or in the vehicle, and (4)
the registered owner of the vehicle was a female with Appellant’s last name. On this evidence,
the jury found that Appellant had driven or been in actual physical control of an automobile while
under the influence of alcohol. No reasonable trier of fact could have found this evidence
sufficient to so conclude.
i.

The jury convicted on proximity and a lack of investigation.

At trial, the State is required not only to get a conviction, but to present substantial evidence
upon which a reasonable jury can find that the State met its burden of proving each essential
element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Schiermeier, 165 Idaho at 451, 447
P.3d at 899. The purpose of such a requirement is to make sure that jurors don’t convict on
improper bases, such as assumption or speculation. Instead, the decision to convict must be based
a minimum quantum of acceptable proof.
In the case at hand, the State admits that the evidence presented against Appellant at trial
was essentially that Appellant was drunk and that three witnesses testified that they saw him
walking away from a car. See Clerk’s Record, 234-35 (Plaintiff/Respondent’s Brief, 6-7) (arguing
that Appellant’s conviction for Excessive DUI should be upheld on that evidence alone). The
district court, in its Opinion, threw in two additional pieces of information—that two of those
witnesses had seen him leaning in the open passenger door and that no other person was found
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near the vehicle. Clerk’s Record, 255-56 (Memorandum Opinion on Appeal, 7-8). The district
court determined that this was sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of a DUI. 3
However, the circumstantial evidence provided by the State and relied on by the district
court is nothing more than the following formula: proximity to a motor vehicle plus lack of an
investigation equals sufficient proof for a conviction.
Two individuals, who spent at most, a few minutes driving by the scene, saw Appellant
leaning into the passenger side of the car. They never stopped or got out of their car; they never
looked inside the car in question. When asked if they saw anyone else around, they said no. A
third individual drove by once and, after seeing Appellant walking away from the car, turned
around, and stopped to offer him a ride. She never got out of her car and never looked inside the
car in question, but when asked if she saw anyone else around, she said no. Neither of these women
saw the car being driven, knew how long it had been there, or saw Appellant in the driver’s seat.
Finally, not a single law enforcement officer testified that he or she stopped at the vehicle, looked
inside the vehicle or around the surrounding area, or knew how long the car had been there.
Instead, Officer Hoop testified that he passed by the car without stopping as he was on his way to
deal with Appellant, who was being detained a few miles away. In short, nobody was searching
for anyone else. No investigation was conducted. However, despite this reality, the State believes
that it is enough to convict an individual of driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle,
beyond a reasonable doubt, if Appellant was near the vehicle and nobody else was found.
Had law enforcement arrived on the scene and found Appellant asleep in the passenger
seat, drunk, and with nobody else around, that evidence alone would be insufficient to establish
The jury was also presented with the fact that the vehicle in question was registered to a female with the same last
name as Appellant. However, that fact was absent in the State’s argument on appeal or the district court’s analysis.

3
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beyond a reasonable doubt that he had driven or been in actual physical control of the vehicle. Yet
on even less evidence here, the State believes that their burden was met.
The State could have done a number of things to tie Appellant to having driven the vehicle.
They could have stopped and looked in the vehicle before confronting Appellant, they could have
fingerprinted the driver’s compartment, they could have located the keys, they could have reached
out to the registered owner of the vehicle and simply asked how the vehicle ended up where it was.
None of these were done and instead, the State chose to base its case on the circumstantial evidence
described above. This evidence, without more, cannot support a conviction unless coupled with
assumption or speculation. Therefore, it is insufficient to support a conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt.
ii.

There was not enough circumstantial evidence on the record upon which a
reasonable jury can have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Appellant was guilty of Excessive DUI.

In State v. Tryon, Idaho’s highest court had to determine whether or not Tryon could be
convicted of possession of methamphetamine, despite the fact that the State failed to present lab
results at trial showing that the substance was indeed methamphetamine. 164 Idaho 254, 429 P.3d
142 (2018). In that opinion, it was recognized that circumstantial evidence can be enough on
which to convict. However, it was pointed out that if the State expects to establish an essential
element of a charge on circumstantial evidence alone, “it remains incumbent upon the State to
provide evidence that meets the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 258, 429
P.3d at 146 (quoting State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134, 937 P.2d 960 (Ct. App. 1997)).
The State argued that they had met that burden, circumstantially proving that the substance
was methamphetamine. They presented evidence that (1) the truck in which the substance was
found was stopped after leaving a known drug house, (2) the officers smelled marijuana after
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stopping the truck, (3) Tryon admitted to having a “weed” pipe in her pocket that was seized, (4)
marijuana stems were found inside the truck, (5) officers found a purple Crown Royal bag in the
truck, containing two hypodermic syringes and two glass pipes with white residue inside and burnt
bottoms, and (6) officers found a small plastic case next to the Crown Royal bag in which they
found a small baggie containing a white crystalized substance. Id. at 256-57, 429 P.3d at 144-45.
Officers additionally testified at trial that seventy to eighty percent of the time when they
find methamphetamine during an investigation, they also find syringes or pipes and that they had
found the syringes and pipes next to the container with the white crystalline substance. After
testifying that he had dealt with methamphetamine on a weekly basis in approximately 100 cases
over three years’ time, and that through his training and experience, he knew how to identify meth
based on its appearance, size, odor, and use (i.e., that meth pipes have white residue inside and
burnt bottoms), the detective claimed that the crystalline substance found in the truck looked to
him like meth.
Despite such circumstantial evidence that the substance was indeed methamphetamine, the
Court overturned Tryon’s conviction, finding that “there was not enough circumstantial evidence
in the record upon which a reasonable jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Tryon
was guilty of possession of a controlled substance.” Id. at 260, 429 P.3d at 148. Therefore, while
convictions on circumstantial evidence can stand, a jury must be presented with a sufficient
quantum of circumstantial evidence on which a reasonable or rational trier of fact can find the
elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. In Appellant’s case, that burden was
not met.
In the instant case, Appellant was found to have been driving or in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle, while intoxicated, without any direct evidence to support such a finding.
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Nobody saw him driving. Nobody saw him in the driver’s seat of the vehicle. Nobody even saw
the vehicle itself in motion or knew how long it had sat on the side of the road. In fact, nobody
even knew if it was operational.
Nobody fingerprinted the inside of the vehicle, to see if Appellant’s fingerprints were on
the steering wheel or anywhere on the driver’s side of the vehicle. Nobody testified that Appellant
had keys to the vehicle in his possession at the time of his arrest. Nobody testified that he admitted
to driving or what he had been doing in the passenger side door. We have nothing at all placing
Appellant in the driver’s seat, in actual physical control of the vehicle, or having driven it.
Instead, the jury was presented with a weak collection of circumstantial inferences.
Appellant was seen, near the car, by a woman who stopped and offered him a ride. She never got
out of her vehicle. He was also seen standing outside the vehicle and leaning into the passenger
side door, by two other women, who never stopped or got out of their vehicle. All three of these
women, who were present at the location for a very brief moment in time, testified that they didn’t
see anyone else inside or near the car. However, according to their testimony, they never even got
out of their vehicles to approach the car, to actually see if anyone else was inside. They certainly
never did a thorough search of the area, as their focus was on Appellant. In fact, nobody did, as
the responding officer himself testified that he too simply drove past the car without stopping on
his way to detain Appellant. (Trial Tr. 100:22-101:6). Finally, the jury was told that the registered
owner of the car was a woman with the same last name as Appellant. 4
These are the facts on which the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant had
driven or was in actual physical control of the vehicle, while under the influence of alcohol. These

Law enforcement never bothered to investigate who this woman was, whether she was related to Appellant, or
whether or not she even knew Appellant. Having the same last name was enough for them.

4
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were also the facts upon which the district court affirmed that conviction. 5 However, under the
analysis set forth in Tryon, this cannot be enough.
The jury in this case was asked to convict based on nothing more than speculation and
assumption. They were asked to speculate or assume that because Appellant was the only person
that these three women, who dove past the vehicle without getting out, saw either nearby or leaning
in the passenger side door of the vehicle, he had to have either driven the vehicle or been in the
driver's position of the vehicle with the motor running or with the vehicle moving. See I.C. § 188004(5) (defining “actual physical control” as “being in the driver’s position of the motor vehicle
with the motor running or with the motor vehicle moving”). Boiled down, this is guilt by
proximity. Essentially, Appellant was convicted because he shared the same last name as the
registered owner of the car, and was seen near the car. This is even less circumstantial evidence
than was presented in Tryon that the substance at issue was methamphetamine and under the
reasoning of the Tryon court, it is an inferential leap that a jury is not allowed to make. Therefore,
as the jury was not presented with substantial evidence on which to find, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Appellant drove or was in actual physical control of the vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol, the district court erred in affirming Appellant’s conviction for Excessive DUI.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court enter an order
reversing the decision of the district court and overturning his conviction for Excessive DUI.

Absent the fact that the registered owner and Appellant had the same last name, which was never mentioned in the
district court’s analysis.

5
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DATED this 30th day of April, 2020.
BENOIT, ALEXANDER & MOLLERUP, PLLC
Digitally signed by Michael D.
Michael D.
Danielson
Date: 2020.04.30 16:01:42 -06'00'
Danielson
By_____________________________________________

Michael D. Danielson
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(Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant)
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